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Personal protective equipment (PPE) is an important part of worker protection during ﬁlovirus outbreaks. The
need to protect against a highly virulent ﬂuid-borne pathogen in the tropical environment imposes a heat stress
on the wearer that is itself a safety risk. No evidence supports the choice of PPE employed in recent outbreaks,
and standard testing procedures employed by the protective garment industry do not well simulate ﬁlovirus
exposure. Further research is needed to determine the appropriate PPE for ﬁloviruses and the heat stress
that it imposes.
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The ﬁlovirus is the archetypal biohazard. A small infec-
tious dose causes highly lethal disease for which there is
currently no speciﬁcally effective treatment. A high
death toll among healthcare workers who care for pa-
tients with Ebola and Marburg virus diseases is a fearful
hallmark of ﬁlovirus outbreaks. Healthcare worker pro-
tection is one of the principal objectives of the interna-
tional response to ﬁlovirus outbreaks.
The most visible means of worker protection is the use
of personal protective equipment (PPE), the material
covering the face, head, and body to protect the wearer
from ﬁlovirus infection. However, this equipment alone
is insufﬁcient, and must be accompanied by other inter-
ventions, such as training staff on safe work practices, en-
gineering a safe working environment in Ebola treatment
units, and employment of administrative controls such
as limiting shift lengths and restricting access. Neverthe-
less, PPE is a critical part of keeping those who care for
Ebola and Marburg patients from becoming infected
themselves.
In past outbreaks, PPE was usually put together using
materials commonly available in outbreak-prone coun-
tries, much of which came from the operating theater:
surgical scrubs, gowns, head coverings, masks, and
gloves. These items were supplemented by rubber
Wellington boots, a rubber apron, a second pair of
gloves, and eye protection (either glasses or goggles).
This conﬁguration was formalized in the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) “Infection
Control for Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers in the African
Health Care Setting” [1].
In subsequent outbreaks coveralls were added, as wear-
ers sought more complete coverage. The garments be-
came more resistant, changing from the material used
in surgical gowns to uncoated polyethylene fabric and
then to coated polyethylene. Polyethylene fabric hoods
that fully covered the head and neck became favored
over surgical head covering. Surgical masks were aban-
doned in favor of masks that did not lie ﬂat against the
face. Most of these changes were made because of the pre-
sumption of increased security, but there was no empiric
basis for the changes other than that granted by the EN
14126 certiﬁcation [2] of the coated polyethylenematerial.
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This progression presents a problem. The need to protect the
healthcare worker from contaminated ﬂuids has led to them
being wrapped in material that allows very little gas exchange.
This impairs evaporative cooling, which is a nontrivial matter in
the tropical environment where ﬁlovirus outbreaks occur, so
that most workers can only tolerate around 40 minutes in
their PPE. The potential adverse effects from overheating in-
clude cognitive impairment and loss of situational awareness,
as well as changes in postural stability, which in a high-risk
environment can be a signiﬁcant danger to the wearer. The ac-
companying potential for severe dehydration, heat illness, and
heat stroke aggravates this situation. Moreover, many facilities
treating Ebola patients are ill-equipped to treat heat illness or
heat stroke (which has a 90% mortality rate if untreated).
The time that healthcare workers can tolerate PPE limits the
total contact time between healthcare workers and their pa-
tients. This puts constraints on how intensively patients with
Ebola and Marburg virus disease can be cared for [3].
As most of the PPE elements are single-use, wearing them for
only 40 minutes at a time results in a signiﬁcant consumption of
material. Ebola and Marburg outbreaks usually take place in re-
mote resource-limited settings, and the PPE material must be
shipped from high-income countries to the outbreak zone.
The high rate of consumption increases the purchase and ship-
ping costs, while adding to the signiﬁcant logistical problems of
distribution to remote areas.
Unfortunately, the evidence base for making informed deci-
sions about appropriate PPE is very thin. A PubMed search
using the terms “personal protective equipment” and “Ebola”
yields 9 items, none of which provide evidence for guidance,
and many of which highlight the aforementioned problems of
the PPE in use during the West African Ebola outbreak of 2014.
THE MEETING
To try to address these concerns with PPE, Médecins Sans Fron-
tières convened a meeting on 3 April 2014, at the Galveston Na-
tional Laboratory in Galveston, Texas. Representatives were
present from the CDC Viral Special Pathogens Branch, the
World Health Organization, the National Institutes of Health’s
Integrated Research Facilities at Frederick, Maryland and Rocky
Mountain Laboratories at Hamilton, Montana the Galveston
National Laboratory, the Public Health Agency of Canada’s Spe-
cial Pathogens Unit, the PPE divisions of DuPont, 3M, andMicro-
gard, and the CDC National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health. This meeting brought together, for the ﬁrst time, experts
in the virology of ﬁloviruses, worker protection and protective
equipment, epidemiologists, and outbreak response agencies.
Their deliberations are summarized here.
The presumed portal of entry for ﬁlovirus disease in the oc-
cupational setting is exposure of the mucus membranes of the
eyes, nose, and mouth to the virus. Intact skin is assumed to be
an effective barrier, although this can be bypassed by sharp pen-
etrating injury or disruption of its integrity.
Given this, the consideration of PPE was taken up in two
parts: protection from the neck down and from the neck up.
Protection below the neck involves the garments that cause
most of the heat stress. Protection from the neck up involves
the highest risk of virus reaching the portals of entry.
Below the neck, the protection afforded by intact skin and
gravity drawing ﬂuids away from the mucus membranes leave,
as the chief risk, the deposition of viral particles onto the skin or
clothes that could subsequently be translocated to the mucus
membranes. The primary role of gowns, coveralls, and aprons
is to prevent deposition of the virus on the skin or clothes on
the assumption that they prevent viral penetration. There is
no evidence that any material does this.
Most commercially available garments that are engineered to
provide resistance to infectious ﬂuids have their resistance mea-
sured by their ability to prevent passage of a tracer bacterio-
phage, Phi X 174, in a synthetic blood medium under varying
degrees of pressure. The tests that employ this bacteriophage are
ISO 16604, which is a test method comprising part of the afore-
mentioned European standard EN 14126, and the similar
ASTM F1671 [4]. Phi X 174 is a nonenveloped DNA virus 27
nm in diameter, whose physical characteristics are rather differ-
ent from ﬁloviruses, which are lipid-enveloped, thread-like
forms 80× approximately 800 nm [5]. As ﬁloviruses are much
larger than Phi X 174, materials passing the standard tests for
protection from ﬂuid-borne infectious agents may well be more
resistant than is needed for protection from ﬁloviruses. As high-
er degrees of resistance correlate with decreasing gas permeabil-
ity, setting too high a standard comes at a cost of decreased
evaporative cooling.
It may be that protection with material passing the ISO 16604
or ASTM F1671 is unnecessary. Healthcare worker deaths in
past outbreaks were stopped with the introduction of PPE
that used available surgical gowns that did not meet these stan-
dards [6]. This may be the result of either the available materials
being sufﬁciently resistant or of any virus penetrating this ma-
terial being inactivated or removed before it could be transferred
to the healthcare worker’s mucus membranes.
A material that was not guaranteed to prevent ﬁlovirus pen-
etration could still be employed, provided that the wearer’s skin
were intact and that the wearer changed clothing and engaged in
a skin decontamination procedure after dofﬁng their PPE. This
would prevent any deposited virus from becoming an infection
risk. This assumes that the worker does not have skin micro-
breaks of which they are unaware.
The priority above the neck is the protection of the eyes, nose,
and mouth. Protective measures must ﬁrst account for direct
entry of virus, such as from coughed droplets or contaminated
hands. However, protection must also account for indirect
entry, such as the movement of contaminated material deposited
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onto the face or carried there by the hands, which may be drawn
by gravity to the eyes or mouth when the wearer is perspiring.
Some PPE conﬁgurations have allowed for the skin of the head
or neck to be exposed, while others offered complete coverage.
The risk of infectious material migrating the short distance to
the mucus membranes was considered high by most attendees.
The decontamination procedures that might allow for toler-
ance of deposition of infectious material on intact skin below
the neck do not apply above the neck. Infectious material
may migrate in running perspiration to a mucus membrane
prior to decontamination. Hair is not easily decontaminated
by simple decontamination procedures, such as wiping with
disinfectant or soap. More thorough decontamination proce-
dures, such as a shower, may cause infectious material to run
toward mucus membranes. As such, complete coverage above
the neck with impermeable protection is advisable.
Above-neck PPE included facial protection that allowed for
maximum visibility of the face while still providing complete
coverage. This would allow better interaction between clinical
staff and the patient. If a nonenclosed face shield is employed,
it should be supplemented by a mask to cover the mouth and
nose from unconscious movements of the hands to the face.
Furthermore, the skin of the lower face should be disinfected
after PPE removal to account for any infectious material depos-
ited by unconscious hand movements.
A fully enclosed solution that would prevent touching of the
face while still permitting full visibility of the face would require
ventilation to prevent fogging of the face shield. Powered air pu-
rifying respirators have been employed in deployed ﬁeld labora-
tories during ﬁlovirus outbreaks, but their suitability and
practicality in the clinical environment has not yet been assessed.
CONCLUSIONS
The limited evidence for the effectiveness of PPE used in ﬁlovi-
rus outbreaks has led to choices being made with little empiric
support. This weak evidence base prevented the attendees of the
meeting from making strong recommendations with regard to
the choice of protective equipment. Rather, the recommenda-
tions were to improve the evidence base.
As a ﬁrst step, it was agreed that the materials currently in use
for protective gowns, coveralls, and hoods should undergo test-
ing in a Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratory to demonstrate
their resistance to ﬁlovirus using standard (ISO 16604/ASTM
F1671) methodology. The most gas-permeable material that
prevented ﬁlovirus penetration under these test circumstances
would be a suitable option for PPE use.
Tolerance for the use of protective material that has not been
shown to be resistant to ﬁlovirus penetration is based on the as-
sumption that intact skin is an effective barrier. As there is no ev-
idence for this, it was agreed that this assumption should be tested
in a nonhuman primate study in a BSL-4 laboratory. Furthermore,
a strategy would be needed to effectively monitor skin condition
to prevent infection via nonintact skin, which could potentially re-
sult from insect bites, sunburn, shaving nicks, dermatitis (includ-
ing disinfectant-related dermatitis), and so forth.
Because the principle danger imposed by PPE was its poten-
tial for inducing heat illness, it was agreed that current PPE con-
ﬁgurations should be tested in an environment simulating the
temperature and humidity of the typical outbreak environment
to determine the length of time they could be safely worn under
normal working conditions. In addition, standardized test
methods designed to quantify breathability of garment fabrics,
such as ISO 11092 [7], could be useful.
These three investigations would establish an improved evi-
dence base for selecting PPE for use in ﬁlovirus epidemics that
would provide sufﬁcient protection from the virus while minimiz-
ing the risk of heat illness in the wearer. Given the unprecedented
scope of the current Ebola epidemic, and the need for the most
effective PPE, the proposed research must be a very high priority.
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